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Environmental Quality in a Differentiated Duopoly
Summary
In a duopoly industry with environmentally differentiated products, we examine the
effects of introducing a mandatory environmental quality standard on firms’
environmental quality choices, profits, and the average environmental quality offered by
the industry. We show that at low standard levels, both firms choose to overcomply
regardless of the standard level. At intermediate levels, the mandatory standard can
reduce the profit of the low-cost firm while increasing that of the high-cost firm, and
that it can lower the industry’s average environmental quality below what it would be
without the standard.
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Environmental Quality in a Differentiated Duopoly
1. Introduction
The past three decades have witnessed two broad trends in concerns about
environmental quality. On the one hand, consumers have become increasingly concerned about
the environmental quality and impact of products they consume. They have often expressed these
concerns both by showing willingness to pay a price premium for the so called “green” or
environmentally-friendly products and by pressuring policymakers to subject the polluting
industries to environmental quality standards. On the other hand, responding to the consumers’
preferences and public pressure for environmental regulations, producers have more than ever
become environmentally proactive. 1 At the same time, firms have been increasingly competing
with one another on the basis of environmental quality either directly, by adopting more
environmentally friendly technologies to improve the environmental quality of their production
processes and products, or indirectly, by engaging in, or supporting, pro-environment activities in
general to enhance their environmental image or reputation (see, for example, Videras and
Alberini (2000) and Antona et al. (2004)). In these fashions, firms have been increasingly tending
to environmentally differentiate their brands and public image from those of their rivals.
Examples indicating these trends abound and include agricultural products differentiated by the
degree of their genetically modified (GM) content, or by the degree of their organic content
(organic versus conventionally produced product), or the extent of their bio-degradability
(recyclability). Gasolines of different octane or lead content, electricity generated by different
processes (fossil fuel-based, solar based, hydro or thermal based) or inputs (coal, oil, natural gas,
biomass), and cars driving on different mixes of bio-fuel (ethanol) and gasoline, or electricity, are
all few among numerous other examples. In this last respect, it is perhaps interesting to note that
to further differentiate itself environmentally from its rival auto companies such as Toyota,
1

For an interesting historical account of corporate environmentalism, see Hoffman (1997). For an
economic and financial view of corporations’ environmental pro-activism, see Heal (2005), who presents
several interesting examples of the corporations (such as British Petroleum (BP), Dow Chemical, and
Heniz) whose pro-environment actions have benefited them both financially and in reputation, thereby
giving them a competitive edge over their rivals, and those (such as Shell oil company, McDonalds, and
Monsanto) whose less environmental-friendly approaches have harmed their public image and
profitability.

1
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Honda Motor Co. has just announced that it “is to mass-produce compact cars that run solely on
bioethanol, becoming the first Japanese automaker to do so.” Bioethanol has attracted attention
as a carbon-neutral fuel that does not contribute to global warming. Furthermore, Honda R&D
Co. and Japan’s Research Institute of Innovative Technology for the Earth “have developed a
new process to efficiently produce ethanol fuel from soft biomass, a renewable resource derived
from plants” (The Daily Yomiuri, Tokyo, Friday, September 15, 2006, p.8).
The trends noted above raise several important questions. For example, what factors
determine the firms’ choice of environmental quality of their brands if they are left to freely
compete by differentiating their products? More importantly, faced with a mandatory quality
standard, do firms have an incentive to overcomply? How does the introduction of a mandatory
standard affect the firms’ degree of environmental differentiation, their profitability, and the
average environmental quality provided by the industry? This paper explores these questions
by adopting a simple differentiated duopolistic model of a polluting industry that faces a
mandatory standard set exogenously by a regulating agency. We take a purely positive approach
and as such do not deal with social welfare effects of either the regulator’s choice of the standard
level or the industry’s choice of environmental quality. The two firms are assumed to differ only
with respect to their costs of environmental quality, perhaps due to having access to different
pollution abating technologies. Each of the firms produces a brand of a commodity that
consumers deem to be different only in their environmental quality attribute.
Although there is an extensive literature dealing with various aspects of interaction
between corporations and environmental regulations [see, for example, one or two references
here], rather few theoretical economic research have explored the specific question of firms’
environmental quality choice in a differentiated industry facing a mandatory standard. Maloney
and McCormick (1982) study the effect of a mandatory environmental quality regulation on
profits in an atomistic competitive industry where the regulation increases a typical firm’s costs
but has no direct effect on industry demand. They show that with restricted entry to the industry,
the regulation can result in increased profits for all firms in the industry creating a scarcity rent
from the right to use the environmental assets. Further, they show that when the firms differ in
2
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their production costs, the environmental regulation may increase the profits of the low-cost
firms while lowering those of the high-cost firms, and that this intraindustry transfer can happen
even if entry is not restricted. Farzin (2003) examines the effect of a mandatory pollution
standard on a polluting oligopolistic industry with identical firms where a higher environmental
quality standard raises both the firms’ compliance costs and the demand for the industry’s output.
He shows the conditions under which a stricter standard leads to a larger profit in the industry, a
larger number of firms, a greater industry output, and a lower total pollution in the long run.
However, none of these studies considers strategic environmental quality differentiation and
possibility of voluntary overcompliance with the standard. On the other hand, Arora and
Gangopadhyay (1995) analyze a model in which firms overcomply in order to attract
high-income consumers, and thereby raise consumers’ welfare. 2 As such, in their model
overcompliance derives from the demand side due the heterogeneity of consumers’ willingness to
pay for environmental quality, which arises from differences in income levels. In contrast, our
model explains overcompliance from the supply side by considering heterogeneity of firms’
pollution control technologies, which lead to differences in their unit costs of environmental
quality improvement.
Salop and Scheffman (1983) (1987) consider a dominant firm-competitive fringe model
of an industry where a lower-cost dominant firm acts as price leader. They show that a
cost-raising action controlled by the dominant firm, which could be interpreted as controlling
product standards or other government regulations, or expenditures on advertising or research
and development, can increase the dominant firm’s profit at the expense of the fringe’s profit and
possibly consumer welfare. 3 Interestingly, however, in our model of environmental-quality
differentiated duopoly, raising the mandatory quality standard can increase the profits of the
2

A strand of literature on motives for corporate environmentalism has emphasized self-regulation as a
strategic means of preempting otherwise higher future government regulations. For a survey of this
literature, see Lyon and Maxwell (2000).
3
For a review of the literature on the use of regulation as a cost-raising strategy, see McCormick (1984).
In a related but different model, Lutz et al. (2000) consider situations where a high quality firm in the
industry takes the role of quality leader by credibly committing to a quality level that is higher than the
anticipated standard to be set by the regulator. They show that by such a strategic action, the
high-quality firm can influence the regulator to set lower standards, thereby leading to a lower social
welfare than would be the case if the regulator were to lead in setting the industry standard.

3
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high-cost firm while lowering those of the low-cost one.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we set out the model and present
the firms’ equilibrium choices of environmental quality of their products in the absence of
regulation. Section 3 examines the effect of introducing a mandatory environmental quality
standard on the firms’ quality choices, where we show that depending on the level of the standard,
either both, or only one, or none of the firms may overcomply with the standard. Sections 4.1 and
4.2 respectively examine the effects of the mandatory standard on the firms’ profits and the
average environmental quality offered by the industry. We show that for intermediate levels of
the standard the mandatory standard can reduce the profits of the low-cost firm while increasing
those of the high-cost firm, and that it can lower the industry’s average environmental quality
below what it would be without regulation. Concluding remarks are presented in section 5.

2. The Model: Environmental Quality in the Absence of Regulation
Consider an industry consisting of two firms, labeled i = 1 and 2 , each producing a
brand of a product. From consumers’ perspective, the products are different only with respect to
their environmental quality attributes but are identical in all other respects. Let α i ≥ 0 denote
the environmental quality and qi ≥ 0 the quantity of firm i 's product.
In general, each firm’s revenue is a function of the quantity demanded of the firm’s own
product and that of its rival firm’s product. It also is a function of both firms’ choices of
environmental quality. Formally, the revenue function of firm i can generally be represented by

Ri = Ri ( qi , q j , α i , α j ) = pi ( qi , q j , α i , α j ) qi . To concentrate on firms strategic behavior with regard
to the choice of environmental quality, and their responses to the environmental standard set by
an environmental regulatory agency, we abstract from firms’ strategic behavior with regard to the
choice of output quantity. This simplification can be justified, for example, by considering
situations where consumers’ aggregate income spent on the products is large enough and the
firms make short-run decisions, so that consumers’ demand for each product is determined by the

4
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firm’s available output capacity, which is assumed to be fixed at qi in the short run. Thus, the

revenue function of each simplifies to Ri = Ri ( qi , q j , α i , α j ) = pi (α i , α j ) qi = Ri (α i , α j ) .
The environmental quality of the firm in our model can be interpreted broadly so that it
not only can represent the environmental quality associated with any stage of production of the
final products (that is, from input acquirement to production processing, packaging, and
distribution). It can also represent a firm’s environmental activities which may not necessarily be
related to its product per se, but could be pro-environment activities which, for example, improve
the firm’s environmental reputation in general. The firm’s incentive to engage in such activities is
to attract consumers who support its pro-environment stance by their willingness to pay a
premium price for the firm’s product. In other words, α i in our model can be interpreted
broadly enough to encompass the notion of firm’s environmental responsibility. We are thus
treating α i in our model as firm’s environmental reputation which can from consumers’
perspective be distinct from how much of the firm’s product they may consume. Accordingly, our
notion of the environmental standard set by the regulator may also be interpreted broadly. It may
not only represent the environmental standard that firms have to observe in production of their
products. It can more generally be viewed as a composite index of a firm’s environmental
friendliness.
To simplify the model, and without much loss of generality, we make two further
assumptions. First, we assume that the choice of environmental quality by a firm does not affect
its output level. That is, the firm’s environmental quality activity is like end-of-pipe pollution
abatement and as such is separate from the firm’s production process, so that there is no spillover
effect from environmental quality activity into the production activity and vice versa. An
implication of this assumption is that the production cost is not affected by choice of
environmental quality. This is consistent with the assumption of constant unit production costs of
the products that we shall also be making shortly. Second, we assume that inputs employed in
production and environmental activities are specific to each activity. An implication of this

5
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assumption is that a firm can not by reallocating some of the inputs from production into
environmental quality activity reduce the level of its output to improve the environmental quality
of its product, thereby obtaining a higher price for its product.
To be able to proceed analytically, we assume the following quadratic revenue
functions:

1
R i (α i , α j ) = − aα i 2 − bα iα j + rα i , i = 1, 2, j ≠ i, a, b, r > 0 ,
2
where

(1)

∂ 2 R i (α i , α j ) / ∂α i 2 = − a < 0 and ∂ 2 R i (α i , α j ) / ∂α i ∂α j = −b < 0 . The first inequality

indicates that for each firm there are diminishing marginal returns from choosing higher
environmental quality levels. The second inequality indicates that an increase in one firm’s
environmental quality lowers the rival firm’s marginal revenue, implying that from firms’
perspectives the environmental qualities are strategic substitutes.
It is plausible to assume that a firm’s marginal revenue is more sensitive to a change in
its own environmental quality than to a change in the rival’s; that is
a>b

(2)

In fact, for a given value of a , the magnitude of b indicates the degree to which the
consumers’ perceive the two products are differentiated, or inversely, how close strategic
substitutes the two products are from the firms’ perspectives. In the extreme case of b = a > 0
(i.e., a − b = 0 ) the two products become homogeneous (zero degree of differentiation or
strategically perfect substitutes) and the firms’ profits would drop to the lowest level. In the other
extreme case, when b = 0 (i.e., a − b = a ), the degree of product differentiation is the highest,
and the two products become independent of each other. In this case, each firm behaves like a
monopolist in choosing its level of environmental quality. As such, one could consider ( a − b ) as
an index of product differentiation or the inverse of it as a degree to which the two products are
strategic substitutes.
To focus on the role of environmental quality differentiation, we assume that the unit
production costs of products are the same, and normalize them to be zero. Let Ai be the

6
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constant unit cost of achieving environmental quality α i . 4 We assume that the two firms differ
only with respect to this cost, for example, due to differences in their pollution abatement
technologies. More specifically, we assume that firm 1 has an advantage over firm 2 in cost of
environmental quality, i.e.,
A2 > A1 > 0 .

(3)

Then, the profit functions are expressed as 5, 6

⎛ 1
⎝ 2

⎞
⎠

π i (α i , α j ) = ⎜ − aα i 2 − bα iα j + rα i ⎟ − Aiα i (i, j = 1, 2, i ≠ j )

(4)

To ensure that both firms can coexist in the market, we need to assume that
r > A2 .

(5)

Otherwise, the profit of firm 2 will always be negative and thus not entering the market.
The two firms play a Nash-Cournot game in environmental qualities of their products.
The problem of firm i = 1, 2 is
1
max π i (α i , α j ) = − aα i 2 − bα iα j + rα i − Aiα i ,
αi
2
α j (j ≠ i ) given.

(6)

Suppose that in the absence of any environmental regulation, there exists an equilibrium

(α ,α ) .7 At equilibrium, the following equation holds:
*
1

*
2

⎡ a b ⎤ ⎛ α1* ⎞ ⎛ r − A1 ⎞
⎢b a ⎥ ⎜ * ⎟ = ⎜ r − A ⎟ .
⎣
⎦ ⎝α2 ⎠ ⎝
2⎠

(7)

With condition (2) one has a 2 − b 2 > 0 , which ensures that a Nash equilibrium is unique and
4

Ai can also be interpreted, for example, as a constant unit cost of pollution abatement.

5

Strictly speaking, π i represents the profit margin (price minus unit cost) for each firm. To simplify the
analysis, we focus on the profit margin, instead of profit levels, which depend on qi , i = 1, 2 .

6

We could more generally write the profit function to include a constant term ci , as
π i (αi ,α j )= Ri (αi ,α j )- Aiαi -ci , where ci can be interpreted either as a unit cost of production or as a

tax or subsidy per unit of output respectively when ci is positive or negative. This generalization
would not affect the results as long as both firms remain in the market.
7
It is shown below (see (10)) that the firms’ profits at equilibrium are positive. Therefore, both firms
can coexist under laissez faire.

7
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stable. 8 The firms’ equilibrium choices of environmental quality are
a ( r − A1 ) − b ( r − A2 )
> 0 (by (2) and (3)),
a 2 − b2
a ( r − A2 ) − b ( r − A1 )
α 2* =
a 2 − b2

α1* =

(8.a)
(8.b)

Notice that whereas α1* is always positive, to ensure that α 2* is positive we need the condition

b r − A2
<
< 1,
a r − A1

(9)

that is, the adverse effect of an increase in the rival’s quality on the firm’s marginal revenue
should not be too large, or, equivalently, the two products should be sufficiently differentiated.
As to be expected, from (8.a) and (8.b) it is seen that the equilibrium choice of the
quality by each firm varies inversely with its own cost of environmental quality and directly with
that of its opponent.
The associated profits at the equilibrium are calculated as
a ⎛ a ( r − Ai ) − b ( r − A j ) ⎞
⎟ > 0, i = 1, 2, j ≠ i,
π (α , α ) = ⎜
2
2
⎟
2⎜
−
a
b
(
)
⎝
⎠
2

i

*
i

*
j

(10)

which ensures that both firms will coexist in the market.
An interesting finding here is (from (8.a) and (8.b))

α1* − α 2* =

A2 − A1
>0
a −b

(11)

which enables us to state the following proposition:

Proposition 1: In the absence of any environmental quality regulation, in a differentiated duopoly,
(i) the firm with the lower environmental quality cost ( A1 < A2 ) adopts a higher environmental
quality than that chosen by its high-cost rival ( α1* > α 2* ), and (ii) the extent of environmental
quality differentiation in the market varies directly with the environmental cost differential and
the degree to which the products are strategic substitutes.
This result parallels that of output quantity choices in a differentiated duopoly (see, for
example, Dixit, 1979, Singh and Vives, 1984, and Shy 1995.) As we shall see in the next
8

See Dixit (1986).

8
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper110

10

Farzin and Akao: Environmental Quality in a Differentiated Duopoly

section, when a mandatory environmental standard is introduced, the asymmetric equilibrium
quality choices, (8.a) and (8.b), give rise to a situation where one of the firms complies with the
standard whereas the other overcomplies.

3. Mandatory Standard and Duopoly Choices of Environmental Quality
In this section we analyze the equilibrium quality choices of the duopoly facing an
environmental quality standard. Let αˆ > 0 denote the minimum environmental quality standard
mandated by the environmental regulatory agency. Taking this standard and the rival firm’s
choice of environmental quality as given, the profit maximization problem for firm i is written as
⎛ −1
⎞
max ⎜ aα i − bα j + r − Ai ⎟ α i ,
αi ⎝ 2
⎠
subject to α i ≥ αˆ , α j ( j ≠ i) given.

(12)

At equilibrium (α1 (αˆ ), α 2 (αˆ ) ) , it holds that
⎛ r − A1 ⎞
⎡ a b ⎤ ⎛ α1 (αˆ ) ⎞ ⎛ μ1 ⎞
−⎢
+ ⎜ ⎟ = −⎜
⎜
⎟
⎟,
⎥
⎣ b a ⎦ ⎝ α 2 (αˆ ) ⎠ ⎝ μ2 ⎠
⎝ r − A2 ⎠

(α1 (αˆ ) − αˆ ) μ1 = 0, (α 2 (αˆ ) − αˆ ) μ2 = 0

(13)

where μ1 , μ2 ≥ 0 are the Lagrange multipliers. Notice that for now we have left aside the
possibility that the standard may render production by one or both firms unprofitable. Later, we
will take this possibility into account and analyze how the standard affects the market structure.
Using the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (13), the equilibria are classified into three types:
(a) Both firms overcomply: In this case, μ1 = μ2 = 0 , implying that α1 (αˆ ) = α1* > αˆ and

α 2 (αˆ ) = α 2* > αˆ , where, as before, α1* and α 2* are given by (8.a) and (8.b). The equilibrium exists
if min[α1* , α 2* ] = α 2* ≥ αˆ . We term the interval [0, α 2* ) as Interval I. Thus,
Proposition 2: Over Interval I, (i) both firms overcomply, (ii) they choose equilibrium quality
levels that are the same as those in the absence of any standard, implying that within this interval
the mandatory standard has no effect on the firms’ voluntary choices of environmental quality,
and (iii) the low-cost firm overcomplies by a larger extent than the high-cost firm does. (See
Figure 1).
9
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An important implication of (ii) is that since the mandatory standard does not affect the
firms’ laissez faire choices of environmental quality of their products, to the extent that
monitoring the firms’ environmental quality levels and enforcing the standard involve social
costs,

zero

mandatory

standard

should

be

preferred

to

weak

standards

(i.e.,

αˆ < α 2* = [ a (r − A2 ) − b(r − A1 ) ] /(a 2 − b 2 ) ). 9
(b) Only one of the firms overcomplies: In this case μ1 = 0 and μ2 > 0 , so that

αˆ < α1 (αˆ ) = ( −bαˆ + r − A1 ) / a and α 2 (αˆ ) = αˆ .

10

This equilibrium exists if α 2* ≤ αˆ ≤ αˆ U ,

where αˆ U is defined by

αˆ U =

r − A1
> α 2* . 11
a+b

(14)

So, calling [α 2* , αˆ U ) as Interval II, we have
Proposition 3: If the environmental quality standard lies within the Interval II, then whereas the
high-cost firm just complies with the standard, the low-cost firm still chooses to overcomply,
although by a lesser extent than if the standard was lower. As a result, the standard reduces the
quality differentiation in the market. (See Figure 2).
The economic reason for firm 2 refraining from overcompliance is clear. Being the high-cost
firm, at higher standard levels (i.e., higher than α 2* ), the cost of overcomplying would be too high
for firm 2 to afford it. On the other hand, the low-cost firm 1 still continues to overcomply, but as
the mandatory standard is raised over Interval II, it lowers its environmental quality, and does so
at the rate of b / a < 1 , which is smaller the more strongly the two products are strategic
substitutes (or, equivalently, the less differentiated they are). The reason for this behavior of firm
1 is simple: since its rival now adopts, and sticks to, a higher standard than it would over Interval
9

Also, see Farzin (2004) who analyzes the social welfare effects of a stricter environmental standard and
identifies situations in which the regulator may prefer no standard to weak ones.
10
The other overcompliance case where μ1>0, μ2 =0 implying that α1(αˆ )=αˆ , α 2 (αˆ )>αˆ can never happen
because otherwise one would have aαˆ + bα 2 (αˆ ) = r − A1 , bαˆ + aα 2 (αˆ ) > r − A2 . By (2), this implies that
aαˆ +bα 2 (αˆ )>bαˆ + aα 2 (αˆ ) .
11

αˆU −α 2* =

Since a - b > 0 , we have a contradiction: α 2 (αˆ ) < αˆ .

r − A1 a( r − A2 )−b( r − A1 ) a( A2 − A1 )
−
=
>0
a +b
a 2 −b 2
a 2 −b 2

(since A1< A2 and a > b ).

10
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I (i.e., α 2 (αˆ ) = αˆ > α 2* ), and since the best response of firm 1 is negatively related to firm 2’s
choice of environmental quality (recall that α1 (α 2 ) = ( −b α 2 + r − A1 ) / a ), it follows that the best
strategy of firm 1 is to still overcomply but to reduce its environmental quality below the level
it would choose over Interval I. As such, by mandating a sufficiently high standard, the
regulatory agency also causes the environmental quality differentiation in the market to narrow.
At the limit when αˆ = αˆ U , even for the low-cost firm 1 the cost of overcomplying becomes so
large that environmental differentiation no longer pays off and therefore both firms just comply
with the minimum standard.

(c) None of the firms overcomplies: In this case, μ1 > 0, μ2 > 0 , implying that α1 (αˆ ) = αˆ
and α 2 (αˆ ) = αˆ . This equilibrium occurs on Interval III, defined as [αˆ U , ∞) . We therefore have:

Proposition 4: At sufficiently high environmental standards ( αˆ > αˆ U = ( r − A1 ) / ( a + b ) ), none of
the firms has an incentive to environmentally differentiate itself by overcomplying. Therefore both
firms choose to comply with the minimum standard. (See Figure 1).
The economic explanation of this result is simple. As noted before, when the
environmental standard is too high, it becomes too costly even for the low-cost firm 1 to
differentiate itself through overcompliance as a strategic means of competition.

11
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(α1(αˆ), α 2 (αˆ))

45D

α1*

α2*

α
Interval I

α̂

αˆU

*
2

Interval II

Interval III

Figure 1. Firms’ equilibrium quality responses to environmental standard

α̂

4. Profits and average environmental quality under the mandatory standard
4.1 Profits under the mandatory standard
It would be interesting to examine the corresponding behavior of the duopoly profits in
response to the mandatory standard over the three intervals.
Over Interval I, the mandatory standard is ineffective, so the firms’ profits remain
constant at the laissez fair levels, given by (10), regardless of the standard level. It is easy to
verify from (10) that π *1 > π *2 . (See Figure 2).
Over Interval II, the profits of the two firms, denoted by π II*1 (αˆ ) and π II*2 (αˆ ) and
illustrated by solid and dashed lines in Figure 2, are calculated as.

−1
2
a [α1 (αˆ ) ] + ( −bαˆ + r − A1 ) α1 (αˆ )
2
2b 2 − a 2 2 a ( r − A2 ) − b ( r − A1 )
π II*2 (αˆ ) =
αˆ +
αˆ
2a
a
Using (15.a) and the envelop theorem, we have for Firm 1’s profit

π II*1 (αˆ ) =

(15.a)
(15.b)

12
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dπ II*1 (αˆ )
= −bα1 (αˆ ) < 0 .
dαˆ

(16)

That is, the low-cost firm 1’s profit monotonically declines as the standard is tightened over
interval II, although the profit always remains positive over this interval. (See Appendix 1)
The response of firm 2’s profit to the standard over this interval is more complicated and,
as shown formally in Appendix 2, it depends on b / a , the degree to which the products are
strategic substitutes, on ( r − A1 ) / ( r − A2 ) , the degree of the cost differential of the two firms, and
on the sign of the expression 2b 2 − a 2 , which determines the curvature of firm 2’s profit function.
Figure 2 illustrates possible responses of firm 2’s profit to the level of the standard in Interval II.
As can be seen, there are four possible cases, labeled A, B, C, and D. Figure 3 shows the sets of
combinations of b / a and ( r − A1 ) / ( r − A2 ) values that correspond to each of the four cases (see
Appendix 2 for derivations). 12
One notable result of our analysis can be stated as

Proposition 5: There is always a sub-range of the mandatory standard level in Interval II for
which as the standard is tightened the profit of the high-cost firm 2 increases while that of the
low-cost firm 1 always decreases.

12

Notice that the relevant values of b / a and

( r − A1 ) / ( r − A2 ) are those to the left of the 45- degree

line to ensure positive α 2* as well as positive corresponding firm 2’s profit.
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(π *1(αˆ), π *2 (αˆ))

π *1(αˆ)

A

π *2 (αˆ)
B
D
C

α2*
Interval I

αˆU
Interval II

α̂
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Figure 2. Firms’ profit responses to the environmental standard
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Figure 3: Classification of the response of firm 2’s profit to the standard level in Interval II
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That by raising the environmental standard, the regulator causes the profit of the
high-cost firm to increase but that of the law-cost firm to decrease is both interesting and counter
intuitive for two reasons. First, it shows that the industrialists’ claim that a higher environmental
standard reduces a firm’s profit is not generally true. Second, following Salop and Shceffman’s
(1983) argument of “raising the rivals’ cost”, one may have expected that by raising the
environmental cost of the high-cost firm, a more stringent standard should benefit the low-cost
firm and not the high-cost one. The explanation for our counter-intuitive and contrasting result is
as follows. By mandating a high enough standard ( α̂ > α 2* ), the regulator sends the credible
signals to the low-cost firm 1 that the high-cost firm 2 has to, at least, comply with this higher
standard. Therefore, contrary to the equilibrium choices over Interval I (or the laissez-fair
equilibrium), the low-cost firm 1 can no longer by choosing a much higher standard (and hence a
greater environmental differentiation) disadvantage firm 2 to lower its quality below αˆ (> α 2* )
and thereby increase its own profit at the expense of firm 2’s. In fact, the introduction of a
relatively high mandatory standard in Interval II alters the nature of the strategic game of
environmental quality competition from a Nash-Cournot one to a game akin to the Stackleberg’s
leader-follower game in that, by complying with the regulator’s standard, firm 2 sets its quality
choice at the standard level ( α 2 (αˆ ) = αˆ ) and lets firm 1 react to this strategy. As such, firm 1’s
cost advantage no longer gives it an incentive to choose as high an environmental quality as it
would have chosen in the absence of the standard. Consequently, we see that over Interval II, the
mandatory standard lowers the degree of environmental differentiation in the market relative to
that over Interval I (or the laissez-fair equilibrium) and raises profits of firm 2 while lowering
those of firm 1.
The contrast between Salop and Shceffman’s (1983) argument and our result derives
from the fact that whereas they model the game of quality competition as the Stackleberg’s
leader-follower variety in which a low-cost dominant firm raises the costs for a high-cost
competitive fringe, our model characterizes the market as a Nash-Cournot differentiated duopoly
in Interval I, and a kind of leader-follower game in interval II but with the difference that over
15
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Interval II it is the high-cost, and not the low-cost firm that leads by setting its quality choice at
the mandatory standard level and letting the low-cost firm react to it.
Another notable result of our analysis is that

Proposition 6: The situations where the mandatory standard raises the profits of the high-cost
firm 2 over the entire Interval II (Case A and Case B) occur when the two products are highly
strategic substitutes (or nearly homogenous, b / a large) and the cost differential between the two

firms is very small ( ( r − A1 ) / ( r − A2 ) close to one). (See Figure 3)
The intuition behind this proposition is straightforward: it is precisely under those
conditions that the beneficial effect on Firm 2’s profits of tightening the standard is the strongest.
In the extreme opposite Case D, where the two products are highly differentiated and the cost
differential is very large, the favorable effect of a higher standard on firm 2’s profit is very weak,
thus leading to the possibility of firm 2’s profit eventually declining to zero as the standard is
raised. Between these extremes is Case C, representing moderate degrees of product
differentiation and cost differentials.
Over Interval III, the profits of both firms monotonically decrease as the standard is
strengthened, although firm 1’s profit always exceed firm 2’s profit and eventually falls to zero
within the interval (See Appendixes 1 and 3 and Figure 2). This case represents the situation
where the environmental pollution caused by the industry is deemed too serious to be left to the
firms’ voluntary choices of environmental quality levels. As such, by mandating a sufficiently
high standard, the regulator trades off the firms’ profits for higher environmental quality and
hence social welfare. In extremely harmful cases of environmental pollution, the regulator may in
fact sets the standard so high as to make the high-cost firm 2 unprofitable or even so high as to
force both of the polluting firms out of the market. In such extreme cases, the regulator believes
that the social gain from improving environmental quality exceeds the resulting losses of firms’
profits and consumers’ surplus.

16
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4.2 Average environmental quality under the mandatory standard
Of particular interest is the effect of a mandatory environmental standard on the average
environmental quality enjoyed by consumers. To examine this effect, we define the actual (or
realized) environmental quality as the weighted average of the firms’ choices of environmental
quality of the products ( α1 (αˆ ), α 2 (αˆ ) ) under the regulated regime, where the weights are the
shares of firms’ outputs in total quantity of the products consumed ( q1 , q2 ), i.e.,

α (αˆ ) =

q1α1 (αˆ ) + q2α 2 (αˆ )
.
q1 + q2

We then compare this average with the average quality which would have prevailed in the
absence of any standard (i.e., the laissez fair average quality), which is calculated as:

α LF =

( q1 − q2 )( a − b ) r − ( aq1 − bq2 ) A1 + ( bq1 − aq2 ) A2 .
( q1 + q2 ) ( a 2 − b2 )

Figure 4 presents this comparison for different intervals of the mandatory standard.

(α1(αˆ), α 2 (αˆ))

45D

α1*
αLF ′

αLF ′′
α2*

α 2*

Interval I

αˆ
α
Interval II
"
LF

U

α L' F

α 1*

α̂

Interval III

Figure 4: Average environmental quality with and without standard
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As can be seen from Figure 4, over Interval I where the environmental standard is
relatively weak, the actual average quality in the absence of any regulation would exceed that the
mandatory standard. The extent to which the actual average quality would differ from the
benchmark (laissez fair) quality depends on whether q1 <> q2 as well as on the ratio of b / a . In
Figure 4, α LF ′ represents the former possibility whereas α LF ′′ denotes the latter case. The solid
lines present the actual (or realized) average quality over different intervals of the standard level.
In any case, a potential policy implication is that when environmental pollution is not too serious
a problem to necessitate very stringent standards, then, as far as average environmental quality is
concerned, having no standard at all may serve the society better than imposing a weak standard.
Interestingly, over Interval II, it is ambiguous whether the mandatory standard leads to a
higher actual average quality than would be the case under the laissez fair. In fact, it would lead
to a lower average quality if α LF ′ > αˆ U (or equivalently, b / a > q2 / q1 ). Inversely, it would lead
to higher average if α LF ′′ < αˆ U . Over Interval III, the comparison of the average quality with and
without standard is ambiguous too. As long as α LF ′ > αˆ U and αˆ < α LF ′ , imposing a mandatory
standard would lower the average environmental quality relative to that under the laissez fair.
Together with the similar effect over the interval II, this result cautions the regulator against
selecting an environmental standard in the range of
⎡ a ( r − A2 ) − b ( r − A1 )
[α 2* , α LF ′ ] = ⎢
a 2 − b2
⎢⎣

,

( q1 − q2 )( a − b ) r − ( aq1 − bq2 ) A1 + ( bq1 − aq2 ) A2 ⎤
⎥
( q1 + q2 ) ( a 2 − b2 )
⎥⎦

However, in Interval III, any standard level such that αˆ > α LF ′ > αˆ U or αˆ > αˆ U > α LF ′′ would lead
to a higher average environmental quality than would prevail under the laissez fair.
Thus, the behavior of the average environmental quality over Intervals I and II enables
us to state the following proposition:
Proposition 7: In a differentiated duopoly, (i) too weak standards will be overridden by the
industry’s voluntary quality choices, and (ii) for intermediate ranges of the standard, a
mandatory standard can lower the average quality below the level that would be voluntarily
18
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offered by the industry without regulation.
Finally, regardless of the size of b / a and whether q1 <> q2 , any mandatory standard
exceeding α1* = [a ( r − A1 ) − b ( r − A2 )] /( a 2 − b2 ) improves the average environmental quality
relative to the quality under no standard at all. This explains situations where environmental
pollution can be socially a serious problem necessitating sufficiently stringent standards that
otherwise firms would not volunteer to adopt.

5. Conclusions
In a simple model of a differentiated duopoly industry, we have examined the effects of
introducing a mandatory environmental quality standard on the firms’ choices of the
environmental quality of their products, the firms’ profits, and the average environmental quality
offered by the industry. We have shown that the effects depend on the degree to which the two
products are strategic substitutes, on the firms’ environmental costs differential, and critically on
the level of the mandatory quality standard.
Specifically, we have shown that at too low standard levels both firms voluntarily
overcomply, thus rendering the mandatory standard ineffective and implying that no standard can
be better than too weak standards. Interestingly, and contrary to common intuition, we have
shown that at the intermediate levels, the mandatory standard can benefit the high-cost firm and
hurt the low-cost one and that it can also lower the average environmental quality offered by the
industry. Thus, we have identified the conditions regarding the degrees of product differentiation,
the industry’s environmental costs differential, and, most importantly, the level of standard
setting, under which the regulation of the industry by introducing a mandatory quality standard
can result in some unintended effects. Besides alerting regulators to exercise caution in setting
the standard level, our results can explain (i) why in situations where environmental quality and
reputation of firms matter to consumers, the “greener” firms may prefer voluntary pollution
control to a mandatory environmental regulation, and (ii) why environmental advocacy groups
cry for strict environmental regulations, fearing that weak standards can alter the behavior of an
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otherwise more environmental friendly firm (motivated, of course, to outcompete its rivals) to
become less environmental friendly by becoming content with merely complying with the
standard.
Obviously, our analysis and the results have been based on a simplified model of the
industry, thus suggesting extensions and further research in several important respects. As a
natural and straightforward extension, it would be interesting to see whether the main results
derived here for a duopoly industry would significantly change if the model is generalized to a
differentiated oligopoly. A more important extension will be to allow the environmental-brand
producing firms to compete not only by environmental quality differentiation but also in output
quantities. The interplay of the firms’ quantity and quality strategies could lead to interesting
equilibrium possibilities. For example, firms may choose to lower their market share but
intensify their environmental quality differentiation or vice versa. Further more, in this paper we
have restricted ourselves to a positive analysis of the response of the duopoly to a mandatory
environmental standard. In an extension of the model, we introduce social welfare and
investigate the regulator’s trading off the social welfare gain from a more competitive market
with that from a higher quality standard. In such a setting, we investigate the conditions under
which the regulator may prefer a low-cost monopoly operating under a relatively high
environmental quality to a duopoly industry surviving under a low standard. Another direction
for further research would be to combine a model of heterogeneous consumers with different
willingness to pay for environmental quality (along the work of Arora and Gangopadhyay
(1995)) with the present model of environmental differentiation to examine situations in which
each firm may produce both a low and a high quality product to attract both segments of the
market, or one in which firms specialize either in low or in high quality product to appeal only to
one segment of the market. Finally, of particular value will be to empirically test firms’
environmental differentiation as implied by the present analysis.
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Appendix 1. Firm 1’s profit in Interval II
Firm1’s profit in Interval II, π II*1 (αˆ ) , is

⎛ −1
⎞
aα1 (αˆ ) − bαˆ + r − A1 ⎟ α1 (αˆ ) .
⎝ 2
⎠

π II*1 (αˆ ) = max π 1 (α1 ; αˆ ) = π 1 (α1 (αˆ ), αˆ ) = ⎜
α1 ≥αˆ

Applying the envelop theorem, we have
dπ II*1 (αˆ ) ∂π 2 (α1 (αˆ ), αˆ )
=
= −bα1 (αˆ ) < 0 .
dαˆ
∂αˆ

(A.1)

(A.2)

That is, the low-cost firm 1’s profit monotonically decreases as the standard is raised.
The minimum profit is attained at αˆ = αˆ U . Since

π II*1 (αˆ U ) =

a ( r − A1 ) α1 (αˆ )
> 0,
2
a+b

(A.3)

we conclude that Firm 1’s profit remains positive over Interval II.
Appendix 2. Firm 2’s profit in Interval II
Interval II is defined as [α 2* , αˆ U ) , where

a ( r − A2 ) − b ( r − A1 )
,
a 2 − b2
r − A1
αˆ U =
> α 2*
a+b

α 2* =
and

α 2* is positive if and only if
b r − A2
<
< 1.
a r − A1

(A.4)

The firm2’s profit in Interval II, π II*2 (αˆ ) , is given by

⎛ −1 ˆ
⎞
aα − bα1 (αˆ ) + r − A2 ⎟ αˆ
⎝ 2
⎠

π II*2 (αˆ ) = max π (α 2 ; α1 (αˆ )) = π 2 (αˆ , α1 (αˆ )) = ⎜
α 2 ≥αˆ

(A.5)

−bαˆ + r − A1
, we have
a
2b 2 − a 2 2 a ( r − A2 ) − b ( r − A1 )
*2
ˆ
π II (α ) =
αˆ +
αˆ .
(A.6)
2a
a
The second term on the right hand side is always positive by (A.4). Therefore, we have the
following four cases:
If 2b 2 − a 2 ≥ 0 ,
By substituting α1 (αˆ ) =
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(Case A): π II*2 (αˆ ) > 0 over Interval II. Furthermore, the profit is monotonically increasing in the
standard ( dπ II*2 (αˆ ) / dαˆ > 0 ).
If 2b 2 − a 2 < 0 , we classify the following three cases:
(Case B): π II*2 (αˆ ) > 0 and dπ II*2 (αˆ ) / dαˆ > 0 over Interval II.
(Case C): π II*2 (αˆ ) > 0 over Interval II. There is α in the interval such that

dπ II*2 (αˆ ) / dαˆ > (<)0 if αˆ < (>)α .
(Case D): There is αˆˆ II in the interval such that π II*2 (αˆ ) > 0 if and only if α 2* ≤ αˆ < αˆˆ II . In this
interval, there is α such that dπ II*2 (αˆ ) / dαˆ > (<)0 if αˆ < (>)α .
We next derive the conditions under which each of the four cases occurs. The condition
for Case B is
0≤

2
2
2
dπ II*2 (αˆ U ) ( a + ab ) ( r − A2 ) − ( a + ab − b ) ( r − A1 )
=
.
dαˆ
a

(A.7)

That is, Case B happens if

r − A2 a 2 + ab − b 2 b
≥
> .
r − A1
a 2 + ab
a

(A.8)

Notice that the last inequality in (A.8) is equivalent to 2b 2 − a 2 < 0 , which is the case we are
considering.
The conditions for Case C are

a 2 + ab − b 2 r − A2 b
>
> ,
a 2 + ab
r − A1 a

(A.9)

and
r − A2
a + 2b
.
≥
r − A1 2 ( a + b )

(A.10)

The latter condition follows from
⎛ 2a ( a + b )( r − A2 ) − ( a 2 + 2ab ) ( r − A1 ) ⎞ αˆ U
⎟
.
0 ≤ π (αˆ ) = ⎜
⎜
⎟ a
2 (a + b)
⎝
⎠
*2
II

U

(A.11)

Putting (A.9) and (A.10) together, Case C occurs if

a 2 + ab − b 2 r − A2
a + 2b
b
>
≥
> .
2
a + ab
r − A1 2 ( a + b ) a

(A.12)
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Notice that the last inequality in (A.4) is equivalent to 2b 2 − a 2 < 0 , which holds for the case
under consideration.
Finally, Case D happens if
r − A2 b
a + 2b
>
> .
2 ( a + b ) r − A1 a

αˆˆ II =

a ( r − A2 ) − b ( r − A1 ) ⎛
r − A1
r − A2
a + 2b ⎞
U
if
<
⎜ < αˆ =
⎟
2
2
a+b
r − A1 2(a + b) ⎠
(1/ 2 ) a − b
⎝

Appendix 3. Firms’ profits in Interval III
In Interval III, firm i ’s profit is
1
2
2
*i
π III
(αˆ ) = max π i (α i ; αˆ ) = − a (αˆ ) − b (αˆ ) + ( r − Ai ) αˆ , αˆ ≥ αˆ U .
α i ≥αˆ
2

(A.13)

(A.14)

(A.15)

*i
(αˆ ) is a concave function,
Since π III
*1
−b ( r − A1 )
(αˆ U )
dπ III
a + 2b
r − A1 ) + ( r − A1 ) =
=−
< 0,
(
dαˆ
a+b
a+b

and

*2
( a + b )( r − A2 ) − ( a + 2b )( r − A1 ) αˆ U < 0 ,
(αˆ U )
dπ III
a + 2b
r − A1 ) + ( r − A2 ) =
=−
(
dαˆ
a+b
a+b
imply that both firms’ profits are monotonically decreasing over Interval III. Notice that before

firm 1’s profit goes to zero, the rival’s profit has already dropped to zero, since A1 < A2 .
For Firm 2 to be operative over Interval III its profit at the standard level αˆ U has to be
nonnegative:

2 ( a + b )( r − A2 ) − ( a + 2b )( r − A1 ) U
⎡ a + 2b r − A1
⎤
αˆ ≥ 0 .
+ ( r − A2 ) ⎥ αˆ U =
2 a+b
2 ( a + b)
⎣
⎦

*2
π III
(αˆ U ) = ⎢ −

Combining this condition with the positivity condition of α 2* ((A.4)), we have

⎡ a + 2b b ⎤
r − A2
≥ max ⎢
, ⎥.
r − A1
⎣ 2 (a + b) a ⎦

(A.16)

Under condition (A.16), there is a unique ceiling of the standard on Interval III, at which Firm 2’s
profit is zero. This ceiling, denoted by αˆˆ III , is given by

αˆˆ III =

⎛
r − A2
r − A1
r − A2
a + 2b ⎞
U
if
≥
⎜ ≥ αˆ =
⎟.
a+b
r − A1 2( a + b) ⎠
(1/ 2 ) a + b ⎝

(A.17)
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